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MU-LTI-STATE TAXATION OF PERSONAL INCOME
In the past two decades, the personal income tax has become an in-
creasingly important source of revenue for state and local governments.1
At the same time, large metropolitan centers have been attracting labor and
capital from adjoining states; many individuals now earn income from
sources in states other than the one in which they reside.2 Consequently,
as more and more jurisdictions adopt the personal income tax and assert
their power to tax both resident and nonresident income-earners, 3 the
danger of multiple taxation will increase unless states exercise restraint in
the use of their taxing power. It is the purpose of this Note to examine
what efforts the states are maling to relieve or eliminate this burden and
to assess the degree of success they have been able to achieve.
I. THE SCOPE OF STATE TAXING POWER
A state may tax the entire net income of residents regardless of its
source,5 and it may tax nonresidents on income derived from sources within
the state.6 Thirty-four states 7 and the District of Columbia 8 presently
1 See HELLERSTEIN, CASES ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 527 (2d ed. 1961);
Caruso, State Taxation of the Income of Nonresidents: A New Jersey Dilemma,
15 RUTGERs L. Rtv. 311-13 (1961).
2 See Caruso, supra note 1, at 313; Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S.
60, 80-81 (1920).
3 See Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation it the American States,
21 MINN. L. REv. 371, 401 (1937).
4 The term "power" is used in the sense of state power consistent with the
United States Constitution. See Caruso, supra note 1, at 313-14.
5 New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Lawrence v. State
Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
A state tax upon income is not an interference with interstate commerce merely
because the income is derived from a source in another state. Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404, 419 (1935).
I Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920) ; Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
252 U.S. 60, 76 (1920); see New York ex rel. Witney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366
(1937).
7ALA. CODE tit. 51, §373 (1958); ArLASA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 48-10-5 (Supp.
1958) ; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-102 (1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2003 (Supp.
1961); CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 17041; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-2(1) (1953);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1101 (1953) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3112 (1961) ; HAWAII
REV. LAWS § 121-3 (Supp. 1961) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3002 (Supp. 1961) ; IowA
CODE ANNr. § 422.5 (Supp. 1962) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3203(a) (Supp. 1961) ;
Ky. REv. STAT. § 141.020 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:31 (Supp. 1962);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 288 (Supp. 1962); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, §§ 5-5A
(Supp. 1962); MINN. STAT. AN. § 290.03(2) (1962) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 9220.03
(Supp. 1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.010 (Supp. 1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 84-4902 (Supp. 1961); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77:3 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 54:8A-3 (Supp. 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-1 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 601(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-131 (1958); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-38-02, -03
(1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 876 (Supp. 1962); ORE. REV. STAT. § 316.055
(1961); S.C. CODE § 65-221 (1962) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-2 (1953) ; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5641-42 (Supp. 1961); VA. CODE ANN. §58-101 (Supp. 1962);
W. VA. CODE A.N. § 999 (50rr) (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71-01 (Supp. 1963).
8 D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1567 (1961).
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impose a tax on personal net income,9 and of these thirty-five jurisdictions,
all but two-New Hampshire and the District of Columbia 0 -impose the
tax on both residents and nonresidents." This broad power to tax both
residents and nonresidents is based on the Supreme Court determination
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit
more than one state from taxing the same income so long as the income has
a sufficient relation to the benefits and protections provided by each taxing
state.12 The Court declined to extend the implication of the subsequently
overruled "death transfer tax cases" that the Constitution prohibits mul-
tiple taxation.' 3 As a result, the Court avoided the necessity of determining
which state would be allowed to tax income earned outside the state of
residence, leaving to the states, acting either alone or in concert, the task of
alleviating potential multiple tax burdens.
Three factors should especially impel the states to seek a solution to this
problem. The financial hardship which multiple taxation could cause sug-
gests that one taxpayer should not be subject to double taxation merely
because he earns income outside his state of residence. Furthermore, mul-
tiple taxation will deter out-of-state employment and investment, thus
immobilizing capital and labor with a consequent deleterious effect on both
state and national economies. Finally, the solution of this problem chal-
lenges the states' capacity for cooperation among themselves, an essential
element of a federal system.
II. SPECIFIC BURDENS AND STATE ATTEMPTS AT ALLEVIATION
A. Classification Problems in the Taxation of
"Residents" and "Nonresidents"
Since states may tax the entire income of residents and the income of
nonresidents that has its source within the taxing jurisdiction, 4 the initial
definitions of "resident" and "source of income" have a significant impact
9 Indiana imposes a tax on gross income. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2602 (1961).
10 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77:3 (1955). However, nonresidents who were
residents of New Hampshire during a part of the preceding tax year must pay a
tax pro tanto. Ibid.
Under the District of Columbia tax law, nonresidents are subject to an "Unin-
corporated Business" tax. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1567 (1961).
11 See statutes cited notes 7-8 supra.
12 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938); Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U.S. 37 (1920).
13 First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 326 (1932); Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U.S. 586 (1930) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
The "death transfer tax cases" were subsequently overruled. State Tax Comm'n
v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942) ; see Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
For a discussion of the then prevailing doctrine that multi-state inheritance taxa-
tion was prohibited by the fourteenth amendment but multi-state income taxation
was not and one writers' inability to reconcile the apparent inconsistency, see Starr,
supra note 3, at 400; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction To Tax Income, 22 IowA L.
REv. 292, 312 (1937) ; 21 MrNN. L. REv. 759 (1937).
14 See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
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on ultimate tax burdens. Many states have so defined these terms as to
achieve a minimal uniformity and thereby avoid multiple burdens. Other
states have minimized definitional inconsistency by construction of their
statutes or administrative practices.
1. "Residents"
Although a few states restrict the definition of "resident" to persons
domiciled or legally resident 15 therein during the taxable year, the majority
extend the term to include persons maintaining a permanent place of abode
within the state for some specified portion of the tax year.16 The purpose
of the latter statutes is to tax the entire income of persons who enjoy the
benefits and protections accorded by the state even though they may not be
domiciliaries in the traditional common law sense.
1 7
When an individual maintains living accommodations in more than one
state or is domiciled in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he resides,
the varying definitions of "residence" may aggravate the burden of multiple
taxation. The following example illustrates both of these problems:
T was born and raised in the state of Mississippi. He is em-
ployed in the Mississippi branch of a nationwide corporation. The
corporation transfers T to its New York City headquarters to
participate in a three-year training program after which he will
be sent back to the Mississippi plant in an executive capacity. T
decides to rent a home in northern New Jersey within commuting
distance of his New York City office. Finding himself working
late at night and missing the last train to New Jersey, he leases
an apartment in New York City, going to his New Jersey home
only on weekends.
The Mississippi tax statute defines a "resident" as any person domiciled
in the state or who maintains a legal or actual residence within the state. 18
It defines a "nonresident" as any person whose domicile and place of abode
are without the state.' 9
15E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §141.010(16) (1962); MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch. 62,
§5A(a) (Supp. 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-15-3(m) (1953); cf. MINN. STAT.
ANN. §290.01(7) (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. §9220.02(e) (1952); see Ness v.
Comnm'r, 279 Mass. 369, 181 N.E. 178 (1932); Feehan v. Tax Comm'r, 237 Mass.
169, 129 N.E. 292 (1921); Phillips v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 195 S.C. 412,
12 S.E.2d 13 (1940).
16E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2002(9) (1947) (6 months); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 138-1-1(11) (1953) (6 months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1101 (1953) (7
months); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3002(3) (1961) (183 days); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§47:31(1) (1952) (6 months); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §279(i) (Supp. 1962) (6
months); N.Y. TAX LA-W § 605 (a) (183 days); N.D. CF;NT. CODE § 57-38-01(10)
(1960) (7 months).
'71 CCH CAL. TAX REP. 1 15-069.
1s Miss. CODE ANN. § 9220.02(e) (1952).
39 Miss. CODE Aim. § 9220.02(f) (1952).
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Under the common-law definition of domicile,20 T may still be a
domiciliary of Mississippi and subject to that state's personal income tax
on his entire net income.21 New York includes within its definition of
"resident" any person who maintains a permanent place of abode in the
state and spends more than 183 days of the taxable year there.2 2  T does
spend more than the requisite number of days in New York, working and
sleeping within the state at least five out of seven days each week. Whether
or not T is taxable as a resident of that state, therefore, turns on whether
his apartment in New York City can be said to be "a permanent place of
abode"; if it is, T may find himself taxable as a resident of New York.23
Although New Jersey does not have a personal income tax act of general
applicability, it has recently enacted a personal income tax provision ap-
plicable to residents 2 earning income in New York. 5 T may, therefore,
be considered a "resident" of New Jersey for the purposes of that state's
limited income tax provisions
2 6
Regardless of T's ultimate tax liability to each of these three states,
the example illustrates the difficulty and uncertainty that faces an individual
in his circumstances. Even if he is aware of the tax statutes of the three
states and the possibility that he may be subject to one or more of them,
the burden of informing himself of his tax liability is very great. Moreover,
any authoritative determination will have to be obtained from the tax
officials of those states.
20 Actual presence within the state coupled with an intent to remain indefinitely.
E.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 240 Minn. 18, 59 N.W.2d 925 (1953).
2 1 Although T is actually present in another state, he does not have an intent
to remain indefinitely but has a present intention of returning to Mississippi within
three years. Thus, there is substantial ground for saying that T has not lost his
Mississippi domiciliary status.
2 2 N.Y. TAx LAw §. 605(a) (2).
23 See New York Attorney General's Income Tax Letter No. 44, Mar. 25, 1921,
1 CCH N.Y. TAx REP. 1 15-075.27. A prior New York tax regulation stated:
A permanent place of abode is understood to mean a dwelling place per-
manently maintained by the taxpayer, and will generally include a dwelling
place owned or leased by his or her spouse. It is not necessary that the
individual be the owner. A person domiciled outside this state who main-
tains a home or apartment in New York, whether or not he or she uses such
place of abode, is to be considered a resident if he or she spends an aggregate
of more than 183 days of the taxable year within the State. On the other
hand, a person who comes into the State to accomplish a particular object,
intending to remain only for that temporary period, who establishes a place
of abode and spends more than 183 days of the taxable year within the State,
is not to be considered as maintaining a permanent abode within the State
unless there is evidence to show an intent to make the place of abode so
established a permanent one.
1 CCH N.Y. TAx REP. 1 15-081. (Emphasis added.)
24N.J. REv. STAT. §54:8A-3 (Supp. 1962) (permanent place of abode for 183
days of the tax year).
2 5 N.J. REv. STAT. § 54:8A-2 (Supp. 1962); see notes 80-90 infra and accom-
panying text.
26 This, of course, turns upon whether T's home in New Jersey is "a permanent
place of abode." See note 24 supra.
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Many taxing jurisdictions, aware of the burden created by divergent
definitions of "resident," have taken various steps to alleviate its impact.27
A few states exclude a domiciliary from the category of "resident" if he
maintains no permanent place of abode within the state, does maintain
permanent living quarters outside the state, and spends less than a specified
number of days within the state during the tax year.28 In addition, several
states allow an individual to show that he has only temporary or transitory
contacts with the state, thereby rebutting any presumption of residence
raised by his spending more than a stated portion of the tax year within
the jurisdiction.2
Another provision expressly enacted to avoid double taxation caused
by inconsistent definition allows a person changing his residence during any
part of the taxable year to report and pay a tax only for that portion
of the year in which he was a resident and to comply with the nonresident
tax provisions for the rest of the year.30 This provision appears to be a
matter of legislative grace since a state apparently can tax the entire net
income of a resident on the tax day, regardless of how short the time he
has been in the taxing state.3 1
One state, Colorado, permits a person establishing a temporary resi-
dence within the state to apply for a certificate of nonresidence. 32 A holder
of this certificate is presumed not to be a resident of Colorado, regardless
of the length of time he may spend in the state within the tax year 3 A
person coming to Colorado for a temporary or transitory purpose who stays
for more than six months is presumed to be a resident unless he holds such
27 Because of its status as the seat of national government, the District of Colum-
bia has several provisions designed to alleviate dual taxation of government officers
and employees. The District tax code defines "resident" to exclude all elective
federal government officers and certain classes of appointees and employees not
domiciled in the District. D.C. CODE ANN. §47-1551c(s) (1961). See generally
District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941). The District also allows a
tax credit to residents of the District for income taxes paid to the state of domicile.
D.C. CODE ANN. §47-1567d(a) (1961). The latter provision eliminates the possi-
bility of double taxation, while the former may, in the case of domiciliaries of non-
taxing states, relieve the taxpayer of any liability.
2 8 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1101 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(a);
cf. ARIz. Rv. STAT. ANN. §43-101(p) (1956).
2 9 E.g., ARiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 43-101 (r) (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
132(13) (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. §316-010(14) (1961); cf. GA. CODE ANN. §92-
3002(i) (4) (1961).
30 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3002(i) (4) (1961) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 279(i)
(Supp. 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-132(13) (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§58-77
(1950) ; see 22 MINN. L. R!v. 746 (1938). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-3 (m)
(1953).
31 In fact, several states that make no provision for change of residential status
appear to levy a tax on entire net income if the taxpayer at any time during the
taxable year was a "resident" of the state or is a "resident" on tax day. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 373 (1958) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.4 (1949), as amended, IowA
CODE ANN. § 422.4 (Supp. 1962).
3 2 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-52 (1953).
3
3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-57 (1953). The statute provides for annual
renewal of the certificate, upon filing a new affidavit. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-
1-55 (1953).
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a certificate.3 4 Only income earned from sources within the state must be
reported by a certificate holder. 35
Although in sum the burden imposed by differing definitions of "resi-
dent" may be slight,36 the consequences to individual taxpayers such as the
one in the example may be oppressive. Nor is there apparently any strong
countervailing state interest in not providing relief for these taxpayers
beyond a possible desire to tax persons who maintain residences in more
than one state. Since the revenue loss to the states resulting from elimina-
tion of this double taxation would be slight and conformity of definition
would facilitate tax administration, closer approximation to uniformity
should be attempted in order to alleviate the taxpayer's burden of deter-
mining to which state or states he must pay tax.
2. "Nonresidents"
A state may tax nonresidents on income derived from sources within
the state.3 7 The definitional difficulty here centers around "sources within
the state." The problem is illustrated by the case of a corporate executive
or salesman who has offices in one state and is paid there, but who performs
the services for which he is compensated in other states. A number of cases
have held that in this situation a state may tax compensation for services
not required to be performed outside of the taxing jurisdiction.3 s Thus a
corporate executive who prefers to do most of his work at his home in
another state may be taxed by the state in which his office is located. On
the other hand, no state appears to tax income earned for services required
to be performed outside the taxing state, although it may have the con-
stitutional power to do so3 9 In addition, although the same income could
also be taxed by the state in which the services were actually rendered, the
great difficulty in allocating income earned for services rendered in several
states may preclude the exercise of this taxing power.40 Certainly the
revenue gained by such an attempt would not outweigh the administrative
burden of collection and the taxpayer inconvenience that it would cause.
B. Double Taxation of the Interstate Commuter
Whenever an individual works in a state other than his residence, he
will be potentially subject to double taxation if both states elect to exercise
the full measure of their taxing power. States have, however, employed a
number of devices to alleviate this potential burden.
34 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-1(11) (1953).
35 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-57 (1953).
36 In most instances the status of a taxpayer will be clear since he will not have
multiple residential contacts but only multiple income producing contacts.
37 See note 6 mpra and accompanying text.
3 8 See, e.g., Morehouse v. Murphy, 10 App. Div. 2d 764, 197 N.Y.S.2d 763,
appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.2d 932, 168 N.E.2d 840, 204 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1960) ; Burke v.
Bragalini, 10 App. Div. 2d 654, 196 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1960).
39 See generally HELLERsTEIN, CASES ON STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 546-48
(2d ed. 1961).
0 Id. at 547-48.
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1. Abstention
Two jurisdictions, New Hampshire and the District of Columbia,
do not tax nonresident income at all,41 and several states, motivated to a
large degree by problems of administrability and to a lesser extent by con-
siderations of multiple taxation, do not attempt to tax all income of non-
residents derived from sources within the state.4 2 The usual statutory
provision restricts taxation of nonresidents to so much of their entire income
as is attributable to an interest in real or tangible personal property located
within the state or to carrying on a business, profession, trade, or occupa-
tion within the state's borders. 43 Income from interest-bearing obligations
and from corporate dividends is excluded from the nonresidents' taxable
income unless it is connected with business, trade, or occupational activity
within the state.4 The states have been less willing, however, to forego
taxation of the entire net income of residents.45 But several states do
exempt from taxable income of residents that portion which is derived from
the conduct of a business without the state.46
A few states make provision in their tax acts for the complete exemp-
tion of nonresidents from any tax on income if a similar exemption is
granted to their residents.47 Maryland 48 has such a reciprocal clause in its
statute; however it restricts its operation to salary, wages, or other com-
pensation received for personal services.49 Since these nonresident ex-
emptions operate in only a very few cases, their beneficial effect on the
reduction of potential double taxation is slight. And, although the limited
exclusions for residents do eliminate multiple taxation on the excluded in-
come,50 in the aggregate they effect little reduction of potential multistate
taxation.
The reason for the limited use of exemptions is probably their lack
of flexibility; exemptions which do not correspond to taxes imposed by other
states, for example, operate to exclude income even when a taxpayer is not
subject to double taxation. States are justifiably unwilling to permit this
taxpayer bonanza.
41 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2020(1) (1960); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1567
(1961) ; OK.A. STAT. tit. 68, §876(a) (Supp. 1962) ; S.C. CODE §65-221 (1962).
43 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2003(c) (1960); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9220.03(2)
(Supp. 1960) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-03 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-101 (Supp.
1962).
44E.g., IoWA CODE ANN. §422.8(2) (Supp. 1962); MISS. CODE ANN. §9220-
12(1) (a) (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-68(1) (c) (Supp. 1961).
4 5 But see ALASKA Coin'. LAWS ANN. §48-10-5 (Supp. 1959) (income from
sources within the state) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 876(a) (Supp. 1962) (income from
personal services only).
4 6 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §290.19 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE §57-38-04(4)
(1960) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.07 (1957).
47E.g., Ky. Rrv. STAT. §141.070(3) (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. §71.07(1)
(Supp. 1963).
4 8 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 291 (1957).
4 9 Ibid.; accord, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.03(2) (f) (SuOD. 1963).
50 See note 51 infra.
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2. Credits
The most important concession made by the states to alleviate multiple
taxation is the allowance of credits for income taxes paid to other juris-
dictions.& 1 Most of the states afford some type of credit to resident tax-
payers 52 and several extend a credit to nonresidents if the home state of the
nonresident reciprocates.m
a. Operation and Limitations
A credit provision permits a qualifying taxpayer to subtract from the
tax owed the credit state an amount equivalent to some portion of the tax
paid to a foreign state.5 In order to prevent unnecessary diminution of
their revenueS5 a majority of credit states place statutory limitations 56 on
the amount of the foreign state tax that a qualifying taxpayer is permitted
to credit. The purposes of these limitations are twofold: to insure that
relief is granted only when the same items of income are subject to double
taxation, M and to reduce the reflection in the credit of a higher rate of
51No study of a state's allowance or denial of credits is complete without con-
sideration of the income it actually taxes. Some states exempt certain types of
income from taxation, instead of granting credits. HELLERSTEIN, CASES ON STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION 561 (2d ed. 1961).52 ALA. CODE tit. 51, §390 (1958); AIz. RLV. STAT. ANN. §43-128 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2017 (1960) ; CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 18001; CoLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 138-1-41 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 30, § 1120 (Supp. 1962); D.C. CODE
ANN. §47-1567d (1961); GA. CODE ANN. §.92-3111 (1961); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 121-12 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3029(a) (Supp. 1961); IOwA CODE
ANN. §422.8 (Supp. 1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3232 (Supp. 1961); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 141.070 (1960); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:33 (Supp. 1961); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 290 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 6A (Supp. 1962); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 290.081 (1962) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 9220-38 (Supp. 1960) ; Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 143.160.1 (5) (Supp. 1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-4937 (Supp. 1961);
N.J. REv. STAT. §54:8A-16 (Supp. 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-15-25 (Supp.
1959); N.Y. TAX LAW § 620(a) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-151 (a) (1958) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE §57-38-04(2) (1960) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 876(a) (Supp. 1962) ; ORE. REv.
STAT. § 316.475 (1961); SC. CODE § 65-340 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-70
(Supp. 1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5646 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-103
(Supp. 1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 999(50iii) (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.05(5)
(Supp. 1963).
53 CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 18002; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1120 (Supp. 1962) ;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3029(b) (Supp. 1961); Ky. REv. STAT. § 141.070(2) (1960);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §291(a) (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-151(d) (1958);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 32, § 5647(a) (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-104 (Supp. 1962);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 999(50cccc) (1961).
Arizona allows the nonresident credit regardless of reciprocation. See ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §43-128(b) (1956).
54 For example, if the amount of tax that the taxpayer would have to pay in the
absence of credit is $250 and the taxpayer is entitled to a tax credit of $50 under
applicable law, then the $50 is subtracted from the $250 leaving $200 payable.
5 5 The possible diminution can be illustrated as follows: A resident taxpayer
has gross income of $10,000, $4,000 of which was earned outside the state. The
credit state's tax on the $10,000 is $500. Taxpayer has paid a tax on the $4,000 to
a foreign state amounting to $300. Had the credit state not elected to tax him on
the $4,000 but restricted its tax to $6,000, it would have realized $250. If it now allows
taxpayer a credit for the full $300 paid to the foreign state, it will receive from him
only $200 ($500 minus $300). Thus, the credit state would maximize its revenue
by not taxing him on income earned without the state.
56 Contra, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5646 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-103
(Supp. 1962).
57 This is consistent with the general policy that the states will relieve a taxpayer
only from more than one tax on the same income.
19631
982 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111:974
foreign taxation than that imposed by the credit state. 8 Thus, although
the states recognize the double taxation problem,59 most-but not all-
allow tax credits only to alleviate the burden created by their own tax
policy; they do not attempt to relieve the taxpayer from different and
conflicting policies of sister states. A variety of statutory formulae are
employed to achieve this end.
Since states taxing nonresident income need not be concerned with
allowing credit for higher rates of foreign taxation-the nonresident credit,
of course, cannot exceed the amount of tax that would be due the credit
state, at its tax rates, on the nonresident income-, the only limitations found
in nonresident credit provisions are directed toward insuring that relief is
granted only in cases of double taxation.
60
In order to ensure that a credit is not taken for taxes paid on non-
resident income taxed by the foreign state but not by the credit state,
statutes provide that the nonresident credit shall be computed as that per-
centage of the foreign tax equal to the ratio of income taxed by both states
to total income taxed by the foreign state.61 In those instances in which the
credit state taxes income not taxed by the foreign state, the credit may be
statutorily limited to that percentage of the credit state tax equal to the ratio
of nonresident income taxed by both states to nonresident income taxed by
the credit state.6 2
Since states allowing resident credits cannot eliminate the crediting of
higher foreign rates of taxation by the device of disallowing credit on items
of income not doubly taxed, the limitations imposed on resident credits are
more varied. They are usually restricted to the lesser of some of the fol-
lowing calculations: (1) the amount of the foreign tax actually paid; '
(2) a percentage of the credit state tax equal to the ratio of income taxed
by both states to the entire income taxed by the credit state; 4 (3) the
reduction of tax that would occur if the foreign income were excluded
58 See Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in the American States, 21
MINN. L. Rv. 371, 402-03 (1937) ; see note 55 supra.
59 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3329b (1961); Phillips v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 195 S.C. 472, 12 S.E.2d 13 (1940).
60 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 18002; Ky. REv. STAT. § 141.070(2)
(1960) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5647(a) (1959) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-104 (Supp.
1962).
61 See ibid.
6 See ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 43-128(b) (3) (1956); CAL. REv. & TAX CODE
§ 18002(d) ; cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-104 (Supp. 1962)
6
3 E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3029(a) (Supp. 1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
151(a) (3) (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 316.475(c) (1961).
6
4 E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-128(a) (2) (1956); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§ 18001(c) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6A(c) (2) (Supp. 1962); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 143.160(5) (a) (Supp. 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-151 (a) (3) (1958); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 316.475(c) (1961).
The following example will illustrate the operation of this clause: Taxpayer has
gross income subject to tax by residence state of $10,000, $4,000 of which was earned
outside the state and taxed by the source state. The tax otherwise payable on the
$10,000 to the credit state is $1,000. The maximum credit for taxes paid to the
foreign state would be % of $1,000 or $400 even if the actual tax paid was greater
than $400.
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altogether from the credit state's tax base; 5 (4) the amount of tax that
would be payable to the credit state on an amount of income equal to that
taxed by the foreign state.66 Although the amount of the allowable credit
will depend on which clause or combination of clauses a particular state
employs, 67 any combination will to some extent eliminate the effects of
higher rates of taxation and differing progressive structures.
68
6 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 141.070(1) (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 290
(1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.081(2) (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 999 (50iii)
(1961); cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-04(2) (Supp. 1961).
Taxpayer has gross income subject to tax by credit state of $10,000, $4,000 of
which was earned and taxed outside the state. The tax otherwise payable on $10,000
to the credit state is $1,000. If the amount earned in the foreign state were excluded
from gross income reported to the credit state, taxpayer would be liable for a tax
of $500 on a reported gross income of $6,000. In computing the maximum credit
allowable, taxpayer would subtract $500 from $1,000 giving him an upper limit of
$500 even if the foreign tax were greater.
' 6 E.g., ALA. CODE tit 51, § 390(c) (1958); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 84-2017 (1960);
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3111 (1961) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.8(1) (Supp. 1962) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9220-38(2) (Supp. 1960) ; OKI.A. STAT. tit. 68, § 876 (Supp. 1962).
Taxpayer had $4,000 of income that was earned and taxed within a foreign state.
In order to compute the maximum credit under this clause, taxpayer would subtract
the allowable deductions and exemptions under the credit state's tax law and compute
a tax on the taxable income thus determined at the tax rates imposed by the credit
state on that amount of taxable income.
67 Taxpayer has a gross income of $10,000 for credit state tax purposes, $4,000
of which was earned in and taxed by a foreign state. The tax otherwise payable to
the credit state without the subtraction of allowable credit is $1,000 and the actual
tax paid to the foreign state was $600. The foreign state's tax structure is more
steeply progressive than is the tax structure of the credit state. On $4,000 gross
income after deductions and exemptions the credit state's tax would be $250 and the
foreign state's tax is $600. The credit state's tax on $6,000 of gross income after
deductions would be $425. Applying the first limitation, the actual tax paid to the
foreign state is $600. If the second clause were employed by the state as a limiting
factor, the maximum credit on the facts stipulated would be $400 (% of $1,000). If
the third limitation were used, $575 would be the maximum credit permitted ($1,000
minus $425). If the fourth clause were the applicable limitation, the credit allowed
vould be only $250 (credit state's tax on $4,000).
68 In the illustrative example in note 67 supra, it was posited that the foreign
state had a higher effective rate of taxation at any given income level because it had
a more progressive tax structure. Although the actual amount of foreign income
tax paid was $600, taxpayer would not be allowed a $600 credit under any limitation
clause. Under the third limitation clause, he would be entitled to the greatest amount
of credit, $575. A state adopting this clause would be satisfied if it received in taxes
from the taxpayer the same amount that it would have received had it not taxed him
on his foreign income. In doing this the credit state not only allows taxpayer to
credit an amount equal to what the credit state's tax would have been on the outside
income computed at the base rate but it also permits him the benefit of the increment
in tax revenue that it would have derived if that portion of income were taxed at
the progressive rate. When the second limitation is employed, the maximum credit
allowable is reduced to $400. Since the limitation is computed by taking a proportion
of the tax otherwise payable to the credit state and the tax otherwise payable is
computed at progressive rates, the credit state permits the taxpayer to credit not only
an amount equal to what the credit state's tax would have been on the same amount
of income upon which he paid his foreign tax at the base rate levied by the credit
state, but it also allows him to credit the same proportion of the increment in tax
that it would have received solely from the progressive rate structure. This position
is midway between the second limitation clause and the fourth. By employing the
fourth clause, the state permits the taxpayer a credit limited to the exact amount
that the credit state would have taxed on a like quantity of income that was taxed
by the foreign state. This method will completely eliminate from the credit allowable
not only any amount caused by higher tax rates imposed by the foreign state, but it
will also remove from the credit any amount resulting from its own progressive
rates.
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In addition to limiting the creditable amount, states have established
certain prerequisites to the taking of a credit. One requirement applicable
only to residents is that taxes have been paid to another jurisdiction exer-
cising a nonresident taxing power.6 9 If a resident is liable to a foreign state
as a resident taxpayer, the credit state will allow him no credit for taxes
paid on that portion of income that would not be taxable to a nonresident of
the foreign state. The most onerous qualification on the allowance of credit
to nonresidents is that the state of residence grant a substantially similar
credit to residents of the credit state or exempt from taxation their income
from sources within that state.70 Usually, a credit may be taken only for
taxes paid to another state of the Union, including the District of Columbia
and occasionally United States territories. 71 Taxes paid to a foreign country
are sometimes credited; 72 however, a state will rarely allow a credit for
income taxes paid to a political subdivision of another state.73 When the
credit state allows a deduction for foreign income taxes, the taxpayer must
elect the deduction or the credit,74 but cannot have the advantages of both.
Generally the credit may be taken only in the year in which tax is actually
paid 75 unless the taxpayer makes his return on an accrual basis.
To prevent a taxpayer from taking more than one credit for the same
income, credit provisions generally provide that a resident taxpayer is in-
eligible for a resident credit if he qualified for a foreign state's nonresident
credit.76 This limitation is designed to apply when the credit state and the
foreign state have reciprocal nonresident credit statutes. Each of the states
will grant a credit to the residents of the other, but deny a credit to its own
residents who are eligible for the nonresident credit of the other. In addi-
tion, nonresident credits are unavailable to taxpayers who take credits in
their state of residence.77 Nonresidents who reside in states that do not tax
personal income are denied a credit for the obvious reason that they are
not doubly taxed.
69E.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 18001(a); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:33
(Supp. 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-151(a) (1) (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 316.-
475 (a) (1961).
70 See note 53 supra.
7 1 E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 57-38-04(2) (Supp. 1961) ; UTAHa CODE ANN.
§ 59-14-70(1) (1953).
72 See MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 62, § 6A (Supp. 1962) (credit for taxes paid
Canada).
73 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1120 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. TAx LAw § 620(a).
74 E.g., DEL,. CODE ANN. fit. 30, § 1120 (Supp. 1962); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:33(3) (Supp. 1962).
7 5 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 390 (1958) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-04(2) (Supp.
1961). But cf. N.Y. TAx LAW § 620(a).
'
76 E.g., CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 18001(b); ORE. REv. STAT. § 316.475(1) (b)
(1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. §999(50iii)(c) (1961).
77E.g., ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-128(b) (1) (1956) ; CAL. REv. & TAx CODE
§ 18002(b).
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b. State Attitudes Toward Credits
There is currently a discernible trend toward the elimination of the
reciprocal nonresident credits in favor of affording only resident credits.78
Only about one-third of the taxing states still provide for a nonresident
credit,79 and even they restrict its benefits to persons who both reside in the
state and are taxed as nonresidents. The decision whether to adopt or re-
tain a nonresident tax credit may be influenced by state self-interest. If a
state can anticipate more revenue from nonresidents earning income within
its borders than it would lose by waiving its claim to tax income earned
without the state by its residents, maximization of revenue can best be
achieved by the adoption of a resident tax credit only. On the other hand,
if a state is reasonably sure that nonresidents earn less within its territory
than its residents earn without, it should enact both resident and reciprocal
nonresident credits, foregoing some nonresident revenue in order to retain
tax revenue from residents on income earned outside the state whenever
the foreign state allows nonresident credit. On this theory, states which
attract out-of-state labor and capital should abandon nonresident credits
while jurisdictions which export labor and capital should retain them.
c. New York-New Jersey Example
Recent events in New York illustrate the possibility of employing
tax credits to implement protective legislation against sister states. New
York City is the hub of employment for many individuals living in neigh-
boring New Jersey and Connecticut:s0  New York taxed both residents and
nonresidents but granted a nonresident reciprocal credit.8 ' Since New
Jersey and Connecticut imposed no personal income tax, their residents
were not entitled to any credit against New York taxes.82  New Jersey,
although not desiring to enact an overall income tax, considered possible
means of diverting to itself the tax revenue paid by its residents to New
York.83 It attempted to take advantage of New York's reciprocal nonresi-
dent credit by enacting an income tax restricted to its residents commuting
to New York and New York residents commuting to New Jersey.84 By al-
lowing a nonresident credit, New Jersey contemplated that New York wold
afford New Jersey residents a similar credit, thereby diverting New Jersey
78 See IowA CoDE ANN. §§ 422.8(1)-(2) (Supp. 1962) ; 1 CCH N.Y. TAx REP.
ff 15-335. Compare MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-4937 (1956), with MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 84-4937 (Supp. 1961).
79 See note 53 supra.
80 See Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1920), in which
the Court took judicial notice of this fact.
811 CCH N.Y. TAx REP. 1 15-335.
82 Ibid.; see HEmLERSTEIN, CASES ON STATE AND LocAl. TAXATION 548 (2d ed.
1961) ; Caruso, State Taxation of the Income of Nonresidents: A New Jersey
Dilemma, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 311, 316 (1961).
831 CCH N.J. TAX REP. 1[ 15-003.
84 1 CCH N.J. TAX REP. 1 15-201; see Caruso, supra note 82, at 320-24.
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resident tax revenue to New Jersey.8 New York, however, responded
by repealing its nonresident credit,
s6 allowing only a resident credit.
8 7
New Jersey residents were thus confronted with the possibility of double
taxation on their New York income, and New Jersey was forced to amend
its act to allow a resident credit for taxes paid to New York.8 8  The
amendment completely reversed the original New Jersey scheme-New
York residents earning income within New Jersey now pay a tax to that
state and receive a resident credit against their New York tax, and New
Jersey residents are taxed by New York on New York income but are not
taxed by New Jersey.8
By New York's elimination of the nonresident credit, New Jersey
was deprived of the larger revenue that it could have derived from its own
residents and was left only with revenue collected from New York residents.
Any action by New Jersey would have decreased New York's tax revenue;
however, New York's response minimized the loss by recouping the larger
nonresident revenue at the expense of abandoning the smaller revenue from
its residents working in New Jersey.
This example cogently demonstrates the interaction between a state's
interest in maximizing its revenue and its interest in protecting its citizens
from double taxation. It is significant that neither New York nor New
Jersey pursued the policy of maximization of revenue at the expense of
subjecting their residents to double taxation. New Jersey, in fact, even
relieved its residents earning income in New York of the nuisance of filing
a return and then claiming the nonresident credit.90
d. Effect of Credits on Multiple Taxation
Although a credit provision does not eliminate the burden of multiple
administration, reporting, and compliance,9 1 it does alleviate the most
inequitable burden caused by multi-state taxation-two complete taxes on
the same income. The taxpayer subject to taxation by more than one
state pays less tax when one of the states allows a credit than could con-
stitutionally be demanded. Admittedly, the tax credit cannot of itself
remedy all inequities wrought by the system, but it is a noble concession
when viewed as an act of legislative grace by the credit state.
85 See 1 CCH N.J. TAx REP. ff 15-301.
80 1 CCH N.Y. TAx RFP. 1 13-335.
87 N.Y. TAx. LAw. § 620.
881 CCH N.J. TAx REP. 15-003.
891 CCH N.J. TAx REP. 1 15-201.
901 CCH N.J. TAx REP. f[ 18-305.
91 Even if a taxpayer is allowed a tax credit from either the resident or non-
resident taxing state, and is thereby relieved of two complete taxes on his income,
the taxpayer must nonetheless file income tax returns to both states. Tax officials
are required to spend time on his return even though he may ultimately be liable
for no tax. See Caruso, supra note 82, at 319.
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3. Personal Deductions and Exemptions
Another device that sometimes alleviates multiple taxation is the al-
lowance of generous personal exemptions and deductions. In strict com-
pliance with the holding of Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,!2 all of the
taxing jurisdictions allow nonresidents personal exemptions.9 3 However,
many states have interpreted Travis to require only that they afford a
nonresident a partial deduction based on the proportion of the nonresident's
total income earned within the state.94 A few states permit a nonresident
to take the full personal exemption, even though only a fraction of his entire
income is subject to taxation.9 5 When a full personal exemption is taken,
the effect of double taxation is diminished; the degree of diminution depends
on the ratio of income taxed by the state to entire income.
Generally, nonresidents are allowed itemized deductions only to the
extent that the deductions are associated with income taxable by the
state; 9 6 expenses such as real estate taxes, mortgage interest, and medical
expenses which are unrelated to the production of income are not de-
ductible. 7 If the taxpayer's home state imposes a personal income tax, he
will probably deduct these items when reporting his income to that state.98
However when the state of residence does not tax personal income, the
nonresident may find himself paying more tax to the foreign state than its
residents who have the same amount and type of income 9 9 A few states
grant nonresidents selected deductions not associated with the production
of income within the state.Y1 ° The allowance of these deductions offers
some relief from burdensome taxation.
C. Administrative Relief From the Burdens
of Multiple Taxation
Many state tax authorities administer their tax statutes in such a way
as to minimize or reduce the burden of multiple taxation. This is most
92252 U.S. 60 (1920). The Court held that insofar as New York allowed its
citizens personal exemptions which it did not allow New Jersey and Connecticut
residents, it violated the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 80.
93 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-149 (1958) ; MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 84-4910
(Supp. 1961).
94 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 388 (Supp. 1961) ; ARu. STAT. ANN. § 84-2020(2)
(1960); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §84-4910(i) (Supp. 1961); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-98(d) (1959).
95 See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 54:8A-10 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. TAx LAw § 636;
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 999(50yyy) (1961) ; HELLERSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 82, at 548.
96See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §47.76 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 84-4907 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147(18) (Supp. 1961); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-82 (Supp. 1962). However, many of these states allow a nonresident a standard
deduction similar to that offered residents.
9 7 Compare HELLERSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 82, at 548.
98 Compare ibid.
99 Compare ibid.
100 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3112(d) (1961); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.-
18(2) (1962); NJ. REv. STAT. 54:8A-37 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. TAX LAW § 635.
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often achieved by an administrative disinclination to interpret the taxing
statutes to the constitutional limit.' 0 ' When the taxpayer is entitled to a
tax credit,102 many statutes have explicit provisions permitting coopera-
tion with the taxing officials of other states to eliminate all or a portion
of income withholding that would otherwise be required. The express pur-
pose of this legislation is "the relief of such taxpayer . . . from the mul-
tiple burden imposed by the operation of several current income tax pay-
ment laws." 103 The states attempt to alleviate the burden of having income
withheld by two or more states when the taxpayer will ultimately be liable
only for a fraction of the total withheld.
D. Effectiveness of State Efforts
It can be seen from the foregoing analysis of the characteristics of
state personal income taxation that the taxing jurisdictions are aware of
possible multiple taxation and have taken steps to alleviate the problem.
No definitive conclusions about the extent of their success can be formed,
however, without an examination of the actual operation of the tax
structures.
III. REGIONAL EXAMPLES OF MULTI-STATE TAXATION
AND EFFORTS AT ALLEVIATION
Since multi-state taxation generally arises out of the interaction of the
tax laws of two or three neighboring states, any attempt to evaluate the
burden of multiple taxation must include an examination of the practical
application and effects of multiple taxation in specific situations. Three
examples of the interaction of the tax laws of contiguous states follow.
A. California-Arizona-Nevada
California, Arizona, and Nevada are adjoining states with a high
degree of labor and capital interchange. Nevada has no personal income
tax; California 1o4 and Arizona 10 5 do. Their statutes are similar in the
following significant particulars: (1) the definition of "resident" is iden-
tical; 'D 6 (2) both tax the entire income of residents and income of non-
residents earned within the state; 107 neither taxes nonresident income from
stocks, bonds, notes, or other intangible personal property unless the prop-
101 See HELLERSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 82, at 547.
102 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3329(b) (1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.19
(Supp. 1962) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5769-70 (Supp. 1961).
10 3 GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3329(b) (1961).
'0 4 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
105 Ibid.
lo Compare CAL. REV. & TAx CoDE § 17014, with ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§43-101(p) (1956).
o10 Compare CAL. REv. & TAx CoDE § 17041, With ARIz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 43-102
(1956).
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erty has acquired a business situs within the state; '08 (3) itemized deduc-
tions of nonresidents are limited to those related to the production of
income within the state,10 9 and no deduction may be taken for income
taxes; 110 (4) full personal exemptions are afforded nonresidents; 111
(5) both allow tax credits to residents 112 and nonresidents.1 3  The rates
of taxation, however, differ.114
California residents who earn income within Arizona are taxed on
such income by both California and Arizona.115 Arizona, however, allows
a credit for taxes paid to California on income earned within Arizona.116
Because Arizona has a higher rate of taxation,117 the California resident
must still pay Arizona a tax approximating the difference between the
Arizona and California tax rates. This sum reflects only the higher Arizona
tax rate and is not double taxation.
Since California and Arizona residents pay no tax to Nevada for
income earned there, California and Arizona taxation of this income cannot
impose a double tax burden. Similarly, although Nevada residents will be
taxed by California and Arizona on income earned in those states,118 they
will not pay any tax to Nevada.
Both Californiaand Arizona tax income earned by Arizona residents
within California.1 9  But because of Arizona's tax credit provisions,
120
the Arizona resident will receive a resident tax credit from Arizona, rather
than a nonresident credit from California. The lower California tax rate 121
will result in an Arizona tax credit for the full amount of the California
tax, and no multiple burden will result.
In this three state area, therefore, there will be no burden caused by
multi-state taxation of the same income. In addition, the substantial uni-
formity of the tax acts of California and Arizona alleviates the taxpayers'
10S Compare CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 17952, with AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-114(b) (1956).
109 Compare CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17301, with A iz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-125
(1956).
110 Compare CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 17204(b) (2), with ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§43-123(c) (1) (1956).
"I Compare CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 17181, with AuZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-127
(Supp. 1962).
112 Compare CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 18001, with ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-128(a) (1956).
11 Compare CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 18002, with Asiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-128(b) (1956). The Arizona nonresident credit does not depend on reciprocity
as does the California credit. Ibid.
114 Compare CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 17041, with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-102(a) (1956).
115 See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
116 See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
117 See note 114 supra.
118 See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
119 See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
1
2 0 Apz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-128 (a) (1956) allows a resident a credit regard-
less of whether the foreign state would also allow him a credit.
121 See note 114 supra.
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burden of acquainting himself with differing tax systems. However, the
unusual operation of Arizona's credit provision which allows residents to
take credits in Arizona, even though they are entitled to another state's
nonresident credit, unnecessarily diminishes Arizona's tax revenue without
contributing to the reduction of multiple taxation.
B. Minnesota-Wisconsin-Iowa
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa are contiguous states, each of which
taxes individual income.122 Their tax acts contain significant differences and
similarities. The definition of resident in each is equivalent to domicile in
the traditional sense.123  Minnesota -24 and Iowa 2 5 utilize federal income
tax calculations, whereas Wisconsin 1 26 does not. All three tax entire net
income of residents and income of nonresidents from sources within the
state; 127 the rates of taxation, however, differ.'2 8  All three states allow
both proportionate deductions for expenses not connected with the produc-
tion of income and deductions for income taxes paid to the state of resi-
dence ' 2 9 as well as the usual deduction related to the production of income.
Wisconsin also permits a deduction for certain income taxes paid it.130
Each state allows varying amounts, 31 characterized as "personal exemp-
tions," to be credited against its tax ;132 Iowa allows nonresidents the same
personal credit as residents, whereas Wisconsin and Minnesota require
proration.'u Iowa residents are permitted to credit taxes paid on income
earned outside the state;13 4 Minnesota 135 and Wisconsin, 36 on the other
hand, give a resident credit for taxes paid to another state on income derived
from personal services rendered there. Wisconsin has a provision ex-
empting income from personal services rendered by a person not domiciled
within the state if the domiciliary state affords a similar exemption3
37
122 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
= Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.01(7) (1962) and Wis. STAT. ANN.
§71.01(1) (Supp. 1963), with IowA CODE ANN. § 422.4(8) (1949).
3 ' MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.01(20) (1962).
125 IowA CODE ANN. § 422.4(1) (Supp. 1962).
126 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.03 (1957).
127Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. §290.03(2) (1962) and Wis. STAT. ANN.
§71.01(1) (Supp. 1963), with IOWA CODE ANN. §422.5 (Supp. 1962).
228 Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.06(2) (1962) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09
(Supp. 1963), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.5 (Supp. 1962).
-29 Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.18 (1962) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.05
(Supp. 1963), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.9(4) (Supp. 1962).
' 3 0 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.05(4) (Supp. 1963).
31lCompare Wis. STAT. ANN. §71.09(6) (1957) and MINN. STAT. ANN.
§290.06(3) (1962), with IOWA CODE ANN. §422.12 (Supp. 1962).
132 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
'34 IOwA CODE ANN. § 422.8(1) (Supp. 1962).
1 3 5 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.081 (1962).
3
3 6 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.05(5) (Supp. 1963).
'37 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71.03 (2) (f) (Supp. 1963).
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Because Iowa and Minnesota have not reciprocated, the exemption does
not affect their residents.
Minnesota residents who derive income from either Iowa or Wisconsin
are taxed by those states,138 and receive no credit for Minnesota taxes.
But a Minnesota resident is entitled to a resident credit from Minnesota
for taxes paid another state on income derived from personal or professional
services. However, he will be doubly taxed to the extent that he has Iowa
or Wisconsin income not derived from those services.13 9 A Wisconsin
resident earning income in one of the other states will be subject to the same
multiple taxation.140
Iowa residents earning income in Wisconsin and Minnesota must pay
a nonresident tax to those states, 4 1 and will receive no credit for taxes paid
to Iowa. But because Iowa permits a resident credit for taxes paid in
other states,142 an Iowa resident will not be subject to any multiple taxa-
tion of income taxed by Minnesota or Wisconsin. He will, however, pay
an amount reflecting the higher tax rates 143 of Minnesota or Wisconsin
since Iowa limits the credit to an amount that would have been due Iowa on
a like amount of income.1 44
Due to the limited operation of Minnesota and Wisconsin resident
credits, residents of those states will be subject to some multiple taxation.
In addition, the multi-state taxpayer will have the added burden of inform-
ing himself about the differing tax structures of each of the states.
C. Virginia-Maryland-District of Columbia
Multi-state contacts are prevalent in the District of Columbia, and
become further exaggerated when domiciliaries of other states migrate to
the capital in pursuit of'government employment but reside in Virginia or
Maryland. Both the Virginia 145 and Maryland 146 tax statutes define
resident to include not only domiciliaries but also every person maintaining
a place of abode within the state for more than six months within the past
year. The tax laws of those two states are also similar in the following
particulars: (1) residents are taxed on entire income; 147 (2) nonresidents
are taxed on income earned within the state; 148 (3) nonresidents are al-
Is3 See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
139 See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
140 See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
141 See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
142 See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
143 See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
144 See note 134 supra.
1 45 VA. CODE ANN. § 58-77(8) (1959).
14 6 MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 279(i) (Supp. 1962); see Reiling v. Lacy, 93 F.
Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1950).
147 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 58-101 (Supp. 1962), with MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, §288(c)(1) (Supp. 1962).
148 Ibid.
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lowed proportional personal exemptions 149 and deductions related to the
production of income within the state; 190 (4) residents are allowed a credit
for taxes paid another state on income earned there; 191 (5) nonresidents
are allowed a reciprocal credit for taxes paid the resident state on income
earned in the credit state.
152
The District of Columbia defines resident to include domiciliaries and
persons who maintain a place of abode within the District for more than
seven months of the taxable year.153 However, it excludes from this
category certain elective and appointive officials of the federal govern-
ment.1' Residents of the District are taxed on their entire income.155 But
if a District resident is a bona fide domiciliary of another state, he is allowed
to credit against his District tax all income and intangible personal property
taxes paid to his state of domicile.156
Domiciliaries of other states employed in the District for an indefinite
time and living in Virginia or Maryland for more than six months of the
taxable year will be taxed as residents of those states 157 and possibly by
their state of domicile, but will not be taxed by the District. 58 Residents
of the District earning income in Virginia will be subject to that state's
nonresident tax. 9 However, since the District does not tax Virginia
residents,' 1 ° residents of the District are apparently eligible for Virginia's
nonresident credit which requires either reciprocation for or non-taxation
of its residents.' 61 Income of District residents derived from wages or other
compensation for personal services performed in Maryland is exempt from
Maryland tax. 62 Maryland will tax income from other sources 163 but a
nonresident credit appears to be available to District residents,16 who
149 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 58-98(d) (1959), With MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§286(h) (1957).
15 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 58-82 (1959), with MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 286(h)
(1957).
151 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 58-103 (Supp. 1962), with MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, § 290 (1957).
152 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 58-104 (Supp. 1962), with MD. ANN. CODE art.
81, §291(a) (1957).
:53 D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1551c(s) (1961) ; see District of Columbia v. Murphy,
314 U.S. 441 (1941).
15
4 Ibid.
-5 D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1567 (1961).
156 D.C. CODE ANN. §47-1567d(a) (1961).
157 See notes 145-47 supra and accompanying text.
158 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
159 See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
160 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
1'8 1 VA. CODE ANN. § 58-104 (Supp. 1962).
162See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 291(b) (1957).
163 See note 148 supra.
164 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 291(a) (1957).
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therefore seem not to be subject to double taxation on income earned in
Maryland or Virginia.
Maryland and Virginia residents earning income in the other state
are subject to a nonresident tax.165 However, since both states have
reciprocal nonresident credit provisions, 66 they will accord a credit to each
other's residents, and no multiple taxation will result.
In these three jurisdictions, therefore, there is no burdensome lack of
uniformity. Double taxation exists only to the extent that persons taxed
by their domiciliary states reside in and are taxed by Maryland or Virginia.
The tax statutes of the District of Columbia seem to preclude its participa-
tion in double taxation, and in fact in some cases afford relief from taxation
when there is no possible double taxation.
167
IV. CONCLUSION
The regional examples support the conclusion that although the burden
of multi-state taxation has not been completely eliminated, its impact has
been greatly reduced. The most effective device has been the allowance of
resident and nonresident credits 168 which not only reduce multiple taxation
but also enable the states to impose limitations which tend to restrict the
allowance of the credit to cases of actual double taxation. Many of the
other devices which alleviate double taxation, for example, the allowance
of liberal deductions and exemptions, operate irrespective of actual double
taxation, and may serve only to diminish the state's tax revenue, while only
insubstantially affecting multiple taxation.
The attitude of restraint that the states have exhibited in the use of
their taxing power and the degree of success thus far achieved in the allevia-
tion of the burden of multiple taxation confirms the wisdom of the Supreme
Court in leaving the problem to be worked out by the states and in declining
to read into the fourteenth amendment a prohibition against multiple
taxation.1
69
However, a greater measure of uniformity 170 in state taxing statutes
than now exists would reduce the multiple taxation caused by conflicting
definitions, and would diminish the taxpayer's burden of informing himself
of different tax systems. Greater uniformity might be achieved in several
ways. One writer has suggested a constitutional amendment empowering
165 See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
166 See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
167 See note 27 supra.
168 See Caruso, State Taxation of the Income of Nonresidents: A New Jersey
Dilemma, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 315, 318-19 (1961) ; Starr, Reciprocal and Retalia-
tory Legislation in the American States, 21 MiNN. L. REV. 371, 402-03 (1937) in
which the author concluded that resident credit does not avoid double taxation as
well as nonresident reciprocal credits.
"The conflicting crediting devices and the wide variation in their scope have
produced inequitable results; greater uniformity among the states would produce
greater equity among taxpayers." HELLERSTEIN, CASES ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX-
ATION 561 (2d ed. 1961).
169 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
170 See Caruso, supra note 168, at 318-19.
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general congressional supervision of state income taxation. 171 However,
in light of the steps already taken by the states, such drastic federal inter-
vention does not seem warranted, and Congress might well find it difficult,
impractical, and improvident to exercise the power of supervision. Another
suggestion is the promulgation of a uniform state income tax statute for
adoption by all taxing states. 7 2  Although this solution is potentially
capable of fostering the greatest uniformity, it too suffers from the defect
of impracticality. Not only do state income tax statutes reflect underlying
economic, social, and political policies that may be peculiar to each jurisdic-
tion, but the income tax is also only one component of an overall tax
scheme, which may include a sales, property, per capita, or other tax.
States blend these ingredients in differing proportions, and the blending
will affect the state's attitude toward its income taxation. In addition,
states very often use tax legislation as a competitive device to attract labor,
capital, and residents from sister states. For all of these reasons, wide-
spread adoption of a uniform tax act appears improbable and state-by-state
modification of a uniform act would, of course, disserve the underlying
purpose of uniformity.
A more feasible alternative is regional cooperation among several
neighboring states since it is among these groupings that the bulk of the
multiple tax inequalities will arise.173 An interstate conference composed
of representatives of each state in the region would form the nucleus of the
cooperative venture. The primary objectives of the conference would
include study of the causes of tax inequality resulting from varying tax
statutes, negotiation of compromise solutions to the problems found, and
reference of suggested reforms to the respective legislatures for adoption.
Agreements for the exchange of information among state tax officers and
plans to eliminate duplicate administration and reporting could also provide
subjects for negotiation. Unlike federal intervention or a uniform tax
act, regional cooperation will permit each of the participating states to
protect its own interests and to relinquish these interests in return for
reciprocal concessions by the other states. A scheme of state cooperation
is also more consistent with the nature of the federal system in that it will
allow each state to retain control over its internal tax affairs. Because
income tax legislation deals with a vital interest of every state-the produc-
tion of revenue-, the mechanism of bargaining for concessions that is in-
volved in regional cooperation offers the most practical alternative for
furthering greater uniformity in state tax statutes, thereby eliminating the
remaining inequality caused by multi-state income taxation.
Daniel C. Soriano, Jr.
171 See Caruso, .mipra note 168, at 320.
172 See Tully, The Tax Credit, in N.Y. STATE TAX COMm'N, SPECIAL REPORT
84 (No. 15, 1958) ; Caruso, supra note 168, at 318; note 168 supra.
173 For an example of a fairly successful interstate conference involving New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, see HELLERSTEIn, op. cit. supra note 168, at
548-49.
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